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It is clearly impossible at this stage to predict with any confidence 
what the outcome of the current Brexit negotiations will be. Reflecting 
on some of the constraints operating on both the UK and the EU27, 
however may be more helpful and illuminating. 
While nearly everyone in both the UK and the EU would like there to 
be a deal maintaining mutual access, if not membership, for trade 
within the Single Market and perhaps “a” Customs Union, there are 
quite lot of people in the UK and the EU27, who would prefer “no deal” 
to one shaped around the Chequers proposals. With members of the 
Conservative European Research Group (ERG) minded to vote 
against the sort of deal that the Prime Minister might recommend, 
Theresa May is likely to have to depend on at least some Labour 
support to get her proposals through Parliament. 
Will this be forthcoming in sufficient volume to offset ERG opposition? 
It is very hard to tell, but it may not be. An important objective for the 
Parliamentary Labour Party is to bring down the government and to 
trigger a general election, even though not all Labour MPs may be 
happy with this approach.  This may lead to heavy pressure being put 
on Labour MPs to vote against the PM’s deal, lessening the chances 
of it going through. Labour will also be mindful of a backlash from its 
erstwhile working-class Leave voting supporters in Wales, the 
Midlands and the North if it is seen to be supporting the government’s 
very poor deal for the country. 
The timing and sequence of events is also crucial. If there is going to 
be a deal, this will have to be agreed and voted through by Parliament 
this side of Christmas 2018, to provide anything like enough time for it 
to be implemented by the end of March 2019. But to get there, apart 
from a deal on trade, Parliament will also have to agree a legally 
enforceable Withdrawal Agreement with – as things stand at the 
moment – two crucial commitments from the UK.  One is to pay £39bn 
to secure the go-ahead for negotiating a trade deal, without any firm 
commitment from the EU27 as to what this might turn out to be. The 
other is for the UK to abide by the EU27’s interpretation of what would 
be acceptable to them on the Irish border issue. Leaving aside any 
consideration to do with an overall trade deal, it is not at all clear that 
Parliament will accept these specific conditions. 
Parliament is thus very likely to be faced with a highly unenviable 
choice: Voting through a deeply unsatisfactory deal almost certainly 
by a very narrow majority, or facing a “no-deal” scenario, for which the 
UK – and the EU27 – are patently relatively ill-prepared. What will 
happen then? 
Again, predictions are very difficult. Good and bad outcomes lie along 
a spectrum, depending very much on the extent to which – when it 
comes to the crunch – the UK and the EU27 are prepared to co-
operate with each other to avoid a cliff edge, with aircraft not flying, 
ports jammed with lorries and food and medicines running short. The 
most likely outcome may be some   reasonably manageable 
disruption, especially initially, until matters slowly settle down, but 
there is a wide dispersion of outcomes either side of this scenario 
which might materialise. 
This is why fear of the worst is likely to push both the UK and the 
EU27 into avoiding a confrontation, with the way to do this being 
some temporary agreement which maintains enough of the status 
quo, to give everyone time to broker longer term solutions. How long 
“temporary” would be would then remain to be seen. Norway voted 
not to join what was then the EEC in 1972, leading, via their 
membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), to the 
Norwegians still being half in and half out of the EU 46 years later. 
It may, nevertheless, then be possible either to negotiate a free trade 
deal along the Canadian CETA lines, although there is no majority for 
this in the UK Parliament at the moment. It is also just possible that 
there could be a second referendum which would lead to the UK re-
joining the EU, although this option is fraught with so many problems 
that it is also unlikely to get through Parliament. More likely, it seems, 
is that the temporary arrangements will drift towards becoming more 
permanent, as has happened in the Norwegian case. 
Among all these uncertainties, however, one prediction can be made 
with some confidence. This is that it unlikely that the UK’s relationship 
with the EU27 is going to reach any satisfactory conclusion in the near 
term. The UK will remain deeply divided, making any resolution of the 
conflicting visions as to what our future relations with the EU should 
be as difficult to bring about in years to come as it is now.  The EU as 
a major element of UK politics will run and run. 
Disclaimer: This blog is written in a personal capacity and does 
not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for Brexit Studies 
or BCU. 
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